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REFLECTIONS ON STANDING:

CHALLENGES TO SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY
WORLD
Jose Felipe Anderson *
''Those who give up essential liberty, to purchase a temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." Benjamin
Franklin1
"Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of
the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we
need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of
crime." Judge Learned Hand2
INTRODUCTION

Among the profound issues that surround constitutional
criminal procedure is the obscure often overlooked issue of who
has standing to challenge an illegal search, seizure or confes-

• Professor of Law and Director, Stephen L. Snyder Center for Litigation
Skills, University of Baltimore School of Law. Adjunct Professor, University of
Pennsylvania, Legal Studies and Business Ethics Department, The Wharton
School; B.A., University of Maryland Baltimore County; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law.
Research funding for this work was underwritten by the National Center for
Justice and the Rule of Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law,
which is supported by a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of
Justice Programs at the U.S. Department of Justice. The author acknowledges
Professor Thomas K Clancy, Director of the National Center for Justice and the
Rule of Law, the faculty and students of the University of Mississippi School of
Law who attended a lecture and discussion of an earlier draft of this paper, and
for the many helpful suggestions that resulted.
1 Benjamin Franklin, Reply of the Pennsylvania Assembly to the Governor
(Nov. 1755), in POWER QUOTES 106 (Daniel B. Baker, ed., 1992).
• United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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sion. 3 Privacy interests are often overlooked because without a
legal status that allows a person to complain in court, there is
no way to challenge whether one is constitutionally protected
from personal invasions. Standing is that procedural barrier
often imposed to prevent a person in a case from objecting to
improper police conduct because of his or her relationship of
ownership,4 proximity,S location, or interest6 in an item
searched or a thing seized. 7 Although rarely penetrating the
news headlines, those who work in the day-to-day vineyards of
3 Standing is the manner in which litigants are allowed into the courthouse
doors. The Supreme Court has made clear that for a party to qualify to litigate,
it must demonstrate "first and foremost 'an invasion of a legally protected interest.'" Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992».
• The Supreme Court has said that privacy expectations have been explained
by "a source outside the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of
real or personal property law . . . ." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998)
(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978». Thus, trespassers, for
example, would have no reasonable expectation of privacy in land that they might
wrongfully occupy. In Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir.
1975), the First Circuit held that squatters had no reasonable expectation of privacy in structures that they constructed on government-owned land. The court explained that "[n)othing in the record suggests that the squatters' entry upon the
land was sanctioned in any way by the commonwealth. . . . That fact alone
makes ludicrous any claim that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id.
Such limitation in privacy protection may even apply when the initial possession
of the property is sanctioned. See Laney v. State, 842 A.2d 773 (Md. 2004) (holding that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as a holdover mortgagor in foreclosed property in which a search was performed and explosives were
discovered); United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 459 (2d. Cir. 1987) ("[W]hen a hotel guest's rental period has expired or been lawfully terminated, the guest does
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel room . . . ."). But see
United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that privacy
expectation may survive if the hotel has a practice of allowing tenants to hold
over the check out time without consequence.).
• See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that privacy interest was affected by the actual location of trash awaiting pick up outside a private
residence). Rights might be affected by whether the trash is located on the private or public portion of the property.
6 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (privacy in personal closed
containers); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (some privacy protection in
the contents of private desk in a government office).
7 See United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (discussing reasonable expectation of privacy in fIles stored on the hard drive of a
personal computer).
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the criminal justice system well know the power of this concept
that often is the difference between who may complain about
an egregious privacy wrong and who may not. 8 Standing is the
keeper of the constitutional gate; and for defense attorneys its
presence is not unlike the mythical Cerberus which guards the
gates of hell9 and will require a Herculean effort to overcome. 10
Newsworthy stories of obviously guilty criminals going free
because of the constable's blunder have often lead to cries for
sometimes extreme criminal justice reform. 11 But the frequency of such rulings as compared to the political attention they
receive does not accurately reflect the difficulty of a defendant
prevailing on an issue where the "exclusionary rule" is actually
invoked. 12 The concept of standing however plays into not only
who can seek the protection of the courts, but how those laws
are challenged and interpreted by trial and appellate courtS. 13
The procedural doctrine acts as a constitutional gatekeeper
that determines who may articulate arguments on the merits of
their constitutional privacy claims. Like all procedural tools

8 Courts simply do not decide every dispute presented to them. Indeed, considerations of judicial efficiency would logically suggest that courts, like any institution, would desire to reduce their workload by imposing administrative tools to
filter matters deemed inappropriate.
• Cerberus, a creature from Greek mythology, was a three headed dog that
guarded the entrance to Hades. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA II READY REFERENCE 691 (1976).
10 Hercules, another mythical figure, had to subdue Cerberus as one of his
twelve labors. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1167 (2d ed. 1957).
11 The oft noted query, whether "[tjhe criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered," was formulated by Benjamin Cardozo while a judge on the
New York Court of Appeals rejecting adoption of the exclusionary rule. See New
York v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 586-89 (N.Y. 1926).
12 The exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine that prevents evidence
from being admitted into court that has been obtained in violation of a
defendant's constitutional rights. It has been criticized as barring "probative evidence that the police are judged, often on the sheerest technicality, to have obtained improperly." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GoMORRAH: MODERN
LmERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 104 (1996).
13 See generally 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 11.3 (4th ed.
2004).
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their functional value is in providing some efficiency and predictability to the system, so that courts may only resolve disputes properly before them. 14 Efficiency is an important value,
but when the balance between efficiency and protecting fundamental rights tips too far toward strict adherence to process it
may well be time to examine whether the rule needs to be
modified. 15
As we enter the twenty-first century with a notable increase in technology, greater concerns for security brought
about by terrorist activity, most notably the tragedy of September 11, 2001, examination of the fundamental doctrine that
protects our privacy is necessary. IS Assumptions about how
well those rules operate in the current climate of emerging
technology, high crime, and terrorism concerns should be reexamined. We should be sure that the circumstances of a changing world do not lead to the long term application of legal principles ill-suited to the demands of a new era. 17

,. See Mary 1. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the
Rights of Relationship, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1593 (1987).
15 See Melvin Gutterman, Fourth Amendment Privacy and Standing: "Wherever
the Twain Shall Meet," 60 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1981).
18 The tragedy this nation experienced on September 11, 2001, resulting in
the loss of 3,000 lives from terrorist activity, created a renewed desire to investigate crime before it occurs by using whatever investigative techniques might be
available.
17 The most familiar area of electronic intrusion that courts have addressed is
wiretapping. But such surveillance, that is, listening in secret, is an ancient practice. As one court has recently explained:
Eavesdropping is an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a nuisance. At one time the eavesdropper listened by naked
ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls
seeking out private discourse. The awkwardness and undignified manner
of this method as well as its susceptibility to abuse was immediately
recognized. Electricity, however, provided a better vehicle and with the
advent of the telegraph surreptitious interception of messages began. As
early as 1862[,] California found it necessary to prohibit the practice by
statute. During the Civil War general J.E.B. Stewart is reputed to have
had his own eavesdropper along with him in the field whose job it was
to intercept military communications of the opposing forces. . . .
The telephone brought on a new and more modern eavesdropper
known as the 'wiretapper.' Interception was made by a connection with a
telephone line.
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The purpose of this article is to examine some fundamental
principles of standing as they relate to other privacy issues.
Many of these concerns have been ignored by contemporary
courts as the technology that affects privacy interests has
marched forward at a break-neck pace. IS The rules of standing
as currently applied will lead to unduly restrictive access to
challenging government conduct effecting privacy interests. 19
Furthermore, the standing rules as currently applied have
lead to the development of faulty doctrine in the area of the
exclusionary rule, which affects Fourth Amendment rights in
general. 20 Opinions that are both illogical and difficult to apply have resulted from current standing rules, and both defense
and prosecution interests have suffered from the poorly crafted
jurisprudence that has resulted. 21 The ill-conceived jurispru-

Kopko v. Miller, 842 A.2d 1028, 1034 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (quoting Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1967».
18 One insightful commentator has recognized that the "advent of widespread
use of computer technology . . . has altered the way in which individuals view
the world . . . . Today, lawyers and business professionals must be cognizant of
communications law, criminal law, privacy law, and many other subjects that may
not have been relevant to their situation only a decade ago." RAYMOND T.
NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, LICENSES, LIABILITIES, JIll (2d ed. 1992).
19 The need for courts to impose procedural rules like standing requirements
is a continuing reminder that courts are functioning organizations which have
their own regulatory concerns. Rules like statutes of limitations and fIling deadlines serve to advance goals other than those achieved by deciding a case on its
merits.
20 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV.
21 See generally CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JusTICE 201 (1978).
Repealing the so called "exclusionary rule" would not make the police
any more effective in their "war" against crime. Despite loud and frequent complaints, the police have not been handcuffed by the rulings of
the Warren Court. Except for minor drug offenses, there is no evidence
to suggest that policemen make fewer arrests, or that prosecutors secure
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dence of standing will clearly continue if broader, more predictable, rules of standing are not developed to meet the challenges
of our high technology age. 22 Indeed, it is my belief that the
poorly reasoned and outdated Fourth Amendment precedent,
combined with the rapid increase in intrusive technology, creates a dangerous lack of checks and balances in privacy protection and the public's ability to adequately respond.23
I propose that standing rules need to be expanded in some
areas and clarified in others.24 Specifically, in a world where
video surveillance is increasingly in use,25 it makes sense to
apply liberal standing rules to those circumstances. 26 Furthermore, the concept of standing needs to be clarified as related to
the seizure of items from electronic databases to insure proper
development of Fourth Amendment law. 27
Recent attempts by the federal government to assist law
enforcement by relaxing requirements for investigating alleged

fewer convictions, because of Supreme Court decisions safeguarding the
rights of the accused; on the contrary, the evidence runs the other way.
[d. at 201 (footnotes omitted).
22 "In time, given the global movement toward democracy, interactive voice,
audio, video data exchange will occur world wide. . . . In addition to fiber optics,
dozens of other technological innovations will end our dependency on the electromagnetic spectrum." JONATHAN w. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 308 (1991).
23 In human terms the value of privacy is high but difficult to measure and
constantly evolving. "Political, social and economic changes entail the recognition
of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society. . . . [TJhe right to be let alone . . . has grown to comprise
every form of possession-intangible, as well as tangible. Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890).
24 It is not my goal to make courts the clearinghouse for all personal privacy
matters; rather, I suggest that courts are in the best position to evaluate new
technology as it emerges.
26 Consider, as an example of intrusion, the use of red light cameras, which
has emerged over the last decade. Currently, the surveillance method is so common that we are no longer surprised by the mailed notices capturing our vehicle
and often a passenger, the time of violation, and our exact location at a camera
equipped intersection.
26 Ail a society, if we value privacy, we should not make ourselves vulnerable
to rapid technological change that will tum our privacy privilege to a right without a remedy .
., See MILLER, infra note 184.
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terrorism under the Patriot Aces have brought the issue of
government surveillance to the attention of an anxious nation
that wants both freedom and security.29 Indeed, Congress and
the executive branch continue to struggle with what level of
intrusion is necessary to insure security.30 There has also been
legislative action on the state level to address the problem of
police access to high technology in investigating crime after
September 11, 2001. 31 Groups calling for more concern for the
protection of privacy have also raised concerns that privacy

28 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). One federal
court had this comment about the law:

The passage of the Patriot Act altered and to some degree muddied
the landscape. In October 2001, Congress amended FISA [Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act) to change "the purpose" language. . . . It also
added a provision allowing "Federal Officers who conduct electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information'" to "consult with federal law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect against" attack or other grave hostile acts, sabotage or international
terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities, by foreign powers or their
agents.
In re: Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717, 728-29 (2002).
29 See FIONA DOHERTY ET AL., LAWYER'S COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A
YEAR OF Loss: REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPl'EMBER 11, 11 (2002).
The Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights has expressed a great deal of concern
about changes, announced on May 30, 2002 by Attorney General John Ashcroft,
concerning the FBI guidelines on criminal investigations and citizen surveillance.
Id.
Under the Attorney General's new guidelines, FBI agents may once
again monitor and investigate lawful political and religious activities.
FBI agents can now keep records of people who attend places of worship--mosques, synagogues, and churches-as well as those who attend
meetings of non-governmental groups. To do this, they may covertly
attend political or religious gatherings, surf internet sites, and mine commercial databases. Furthermore, they can do all of this without showing
any reason to suspect any criminal activity. . . . In addition, there is no
time limit on how long the information may be retained.

Id.
30 See generally id.
at 7-12. The USA Patriot Act was passed only a few
weeks after the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Accordingly, it did not receive the
normal scrutiny as if it had gone through the complete legislative process. Id. at
1-2.
31 The American Civil Liberties Union has been actively involved in examining
the provisions of the USA Patriot Act.
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rights are being unfairly curtailed. 32
The creation of an office of homeland security33 and the
continuing war on terrorism34 have made citizens of the United States acutely aware that notions of privacy are being challenged in ways unknown to prior generations. 35 By clarifying
the role that standing plays in the constitutional equation, we
may be able to create a more efficient and predictable system
to review the uses of privacy technology.
STANDING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL GATEKEEPER:
CIVIL STANDING AND CIVIL RIGHTS

In order to properly fashion adequate rules of standing in
constitutional criminal procedure, it is useful to explore how
standing has developed in civil litigation for civil rights.36

aa The Council on American-Islamic Relations Research Center has recently
described the problem of civil rights challenges faced by Muslims in a post Sep,
tember 11th world. Reporting a 64 percent increase in anti-Muslim sentiment
since the fall of the world trade center, the Council's executive summary explains,
The fallout from September 11 continues to impact Muslim daily life,
whether at school, in the workplace or in general public encounters.
Mistreatment at the hand of federal government personnel continue to
be reported in substantial numbers. FBI agents and other local law
enforcement authorities have sometimes responded to hearsay reports,
and conducted questionable raids and interrogations. . . . Also, many
Muslim homes and businesses were raided and private property seized
pending investigation. Moreover, queries by some FBI agents about
mosque membership list and media reports about a proposed FBI counting of mosques raised widespread apprehensions among community members who believe they are being scrutinized based on their religious
association.
Guilt By Association-The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States 2003,
CAl R, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS RESEARCH CENTER 1 (2003).
33 See John Gibeaut, Winds of Change, 87 ABA J. 32 (Nov. 2001) (discussing
the creation of an office of homeland security).
34 [d.
35 The right to be let alone by government officials unless there exists sufficient cause is protected by the Fourth Amendment. This right is "perhaps the
most personal of all legal principles. It is also one of the newest, since only the.
more sophisticated of societies have the interest and the ability to nurture that
subtle and most personal possession of man, his dignity." MORRIS L. ERNST &
ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRNACY, THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALoNE 1 (1962).
36 See generally Roy L. BROOKS ET AL., CNIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, CASES AND
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There are many analogies between civil rights civil litigation
and the assertion of constitutional criminal rights. 37 For example, each rests largely on the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to enforce various rights against state governments. 38 Both are based on concepts of personal freedom and
autonomy and individual fundamental rights. 39 Both types of
cases may lead to precedent that apply to large classes of other
litigants. Finally, both civil and criminal individual rights
claims are based on the notion that government must be just
when it uses its power against individuals. 40 The government
may not simply go about its business as a routine law breaker.41 To sanction such government behavior would lead to disrespect for the rule of law. 42 When government becomes a lawbreaker, the dissatisfaction of those who are governed sometimes leads to drastic changes like in our own American revolu-

PERSPECTIVES, 9-13, 48-50 (2d ed. Carolina Academic Press 2000). Civil Rights
cases have been the primary work of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) during the flrst part of the twentieth century. Id. Using the courts to protect personal rights was a new concept at that
period in American jurisprudence. Id.
37 Most civil rights litigation has an effect on a broad range of citizens rather
than a purely private dispute.
38 Like other individual rights found in the Federal Constitution, the incorporation doctrine makes many of those rights fundamental and fully applicable to
government action of the several states.
39 The Fourth Amendment reflects critical values. "Indeed, these rights are so
strong that the Constitution prohibits the most minimal transgressions against
them . . . . Personal security, liberty, and private property are not discrete interests; they unite to deflne signillcant attributes of individual freedom in the democracY." Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 576
(1996).
.. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 991 (1987) ("Constitutional law provides a set of peremptory
norms-a checking power-that is basic to the American notion of a government
of limited powers.").
U
United States v. Berger, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
'2 Government cannot be a law-breaker; judicial review of police conduct
serves to enforce that principle. "(H]aving judges decide what police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment reflects a distrust of society's ability or willingness
to apply the Fourth Amendment properly." George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73
B.U. L. REV. 147, 149 (1993).
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tion. 43
Our system of criminal justice should also re-examine
doctrine when new rules will encourage government to advance
its goal to protect privacy values which contribute to the quality of life, even though the need for higher security may exist. 44
The concept that a litigant in court needs an interest in the
litigation to challenge the conduct of a party in a suit is not a
new concept. 45 In civil litigation, standing rules prevent courts
from deciding issues on behalf of parties that have no stake in
a legal dispute. 46 As a matter of civil procedure, standing rules
are crafted to uphold the legal principal that courts are for the
purpose of resolving actual, as opposed to hypothetical, disputes. 47
Courts do not make themselves available to give advisory
opinions on rights and remedies, and standing rules are one of
the tools they use to ignore the merits of many disputes. 48 The
4S "Advances in science and technology recurrently exert pressure on the scope
and meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but the privacy and security protected by
the Fourth Amendment should not depend on innovations and technology. . . .
During the Framers' era, the home was the focal point of privacy and personal
security." Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
"When the American Republic was founded, the framers established a libertarian
equilibrium among the competing values of privacy, disclosure and surveillance."
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 67 (1967).
.. See supra note 4.
45 Standing
in civil cases is often based on the injury sustained. In
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923), the Supreme Court held that a
taxpayer who objected to the federal government giving grants to the states to
fund a reduction in infant mortality did not have standing to sue. She claimed
the grants would increase her tax liability. [d. at 486. The Court reasoned that
she had no immediate danger or direct injury from the government action. [d.
46 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that a taxpayer would have
standing to oppose the Federal Aid to Education Act on establishment clause
grounds if they can show a logical nexus between the status of the taxpayer and
the claim; the Court reasoned that the specific constitutional limitation of government support for religion provided a sufficient nexus).
47 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (holding that general
standing as a citizen does not establish enough direct injury to me suit).
4' Generally, the cases and controversies requirement of Article III, Section 2
limits review of hypothetical questions by the court and prohibits the federal
court from issuing advisory opinions. Such a rule assures that courts will decide
only focused and specific conflicts between adversaries. See United States v.
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obvious reason for avoiding such intervention as a routine
matter is to preserve the division of governmental responsibility. Courts decide disputes while legislatures craft law. The
balance of power dictates that courts should confine their role
to the decision-making necessary to keep the peace. 49 Occasionally, a court my render some guidance on such tangential
matters, but such opinions are clearly the exception to the
general, well-settled rule. 50
In the context of civil litigation, the doctrine of standing,
ripeness,51 and case and controversr2 have stood as a barrier
to the courts from aggressively making law without benefit of a
plaintiff. These rules leave to the legislative and executive
branches of government the responsibility of creating desirable
policies for addressing societal problems that are not in the adversarial position needed for court based dispute resolution. 53
Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961).
49 Resolving disputes peacefully includes the judiciary's interest in reaching a
decision which is also fmal between the parties. See Chicago & S. Airlines v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
60 The Supreme Court has occasionally reviewed cases when they might otherwise be moot because the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See,
e.g., S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 514
(1911).
51 See United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1975) (holding
that federal public employees wishing to challenge the Federal Hatch Act, which
prohibited certain types of political activity, had no standing because the issue
was not yet ripe; the workers did not describe the acts in which they wanted to
engage).
&2 The case and controversy requirement is a doctrine which courts invoke to
avoid deciding certain types of matters describing them as either not ripe or
moot. As one scholar has cogently explained:

The mootness doctrine is derived from the Article ill prohibition against
federal courts issuing advisory or declaratory opinions where no active
controversy exists. If there is no longer an active controversy between
adverse parties then the case should be found moot. One exception to
the mootness doctrine is the voluntary cessation exception. Under this
exception, voluntary cessation of the improper behavior by one party will
not cause the case to be dismissed if the party is free to return to the
behavior at any time.
Marc M. Harrold, Stripping Away at the First Amendment:The Increasing Paternal
Voice of Our Living Constitution, 32 U. MEM. L. REv. 403, 423 (2002) (footnotes
omitted).
53 I do not intend to suggest that legislative role in protecting privacy is not
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Such challenges were often faced where litigants attempted to
bring actions to court during the civil rights era. 54 Lawyers
from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People constantly faced these barriers when it attempted to
bring progressive civil rights reforms to the nation through use
of the court system. 55 The need for aggrieved plaintiffs never
ended, particularly in cases that would take years, sometimes
decades, to resolve in the litigation process. 56
In the famous case of Brown v. Board of Education 57 for
example, the litigation that ultimately lead to the landmark
Supreme Court decision was actually several law suits with
many plaintiffs from several jurisdictions.58 The cases were
developed simultaneously so that at least one of them would
survive to the nation's highest court. The strategy finally
worked, but the lawyers lost many litigants along the way. 59
In other civil rights litigation like NAACP v. Alabama,60
essential. In the same way courts are likely to address more privacy issues, legislatures should be alert to respond to privacy concerns where there is consensus
that such intrusions should be regulated.
54 During early civil rights litigation, sometimes courts would seek ways to
dismiss "separate but equal" claims on any basis possible. In one instance, the
legendary Thurgood Marshall, serving as chief counsel for the NAACP during the
1950's, had a case dismissed in South Carolina because the parent of the child
who sought school bus services paid his property taxes in a county different from
the county where the only available "colored" school was located. RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 3-17 (1976). In planning to file a new case, Marshall
announced that he would seek a "firm, unified group of twenty plaintiffs" to prevent dismissal on a technicality based on standing. Id. at 18.
66 Civil Rights litigation required filing a number of cases in different jurisdictions. In 1951, for example, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers travelled
72,000 miles litigating Civil Rights cases. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN
THE COURTS 81 (1994).
66 The litigation strategy to overturn the Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), separate but equal doctrine required a litigation strategy which took decades to accomplish through a series of Supreme Court cases. See KLUGER, supra
note 54.
67 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68 Id. at 486. Brown was actually a consolidation of five cases from not only
Kansas, but also Delaware; South Carolina; Washington, D.C.; and Virginia.
69 Those who participated in the cases would often be threatened financially
with refusal of credit and farm Bupplies if they filed civil rights suits. See
KLUGER, supra note 54.
60 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court held that the civil
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issues of standing again confronted the Supreme Court as it
struggled to fashion fair rules to permit constitutional rights to
be properly determined by the court without the interference of
procedural barrier. 61 The Court properly recognized that there
is something about civil rights litigation that distinguishes it
from ordinary cases and controversies and allows the Court to
resolve purely private matters.62
CRIMINAL STANDING: UNSTABLE ORIGINS

From the very beginning of challenges to police conduct on
constitutional grounds one of the primary issues has been who
gets to complain. 63 In the early 1900's, the Supreme Court resolved a dispute on that issue in Weeks u. United States. 64 The
Supreme Court recognized the need to establish an
exclusionary rule to prohibit illegally seized evidence from
being introduced at trial. 65 Although Weeks was not a standing case, it illustrated the direction the litigation on police
intrusion would take in the decades to come. 66 Thereafter, the
rights organization did not have to disclose its membership list because "privacy
in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation
of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs."
Id. at 462. Implicit in the holding is that the unnamed members had standing to
assert their protected association rights.
61 The barriers to civil rights litigation was not restricted merely to procedural
matters, but also extended to threats of violence. "In making trips to southern
court houses, there were many close calls. Threats of lynching, assault and murder were routine." CARL ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS 7 (1993).
62 However, the Supreme Court has also denied standing based upon minority
group status. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (parents of black school
children who sued the IRS claiming that discriminatory private schools should not
receive tax exempt status were denied standing). The Court ruled that such "stigmatizing injury" was not enough to confer status on the parents. Id. at 738. In
some instances a civil rights organization should be permitted to serve as a "private attorney general" for purpose of litigating civil rights actions. HARRy
KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE 1ST AMENDMENT 80 (1965) (quoting Comment,
Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE
L.J. 574, 581-89 (1949).
63 Police have always relied on sources of information that they may have
come about by practices they could not engage in themselves.
64 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
65 Id. at 392.
66 See T.S.L. Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64
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court struggled with the relationship between federal and state
criminal justice investigations and how to best conduct them. 67
The key issues often centered around the exclusionary rule
which had been recognized by the Supreme Court in Weeks but
had not been adopted in many stateS. 68 Thus, in states that
did not provide the remedy of exclusion of the evidence, police
were free to engage in misconduct without fear that they would
loose any evidence at trial. 69
It was not until Wolf v. Colorado70 in 1949 that the Court
recognized that illegal state searches may violate the Federal
Constitution, but the Court was unwilling at that time to apply
the exclusionary rule to the states. 71 In an opinion by Justice
Felix Frankfurter, the Court rejected the adoption of a national
exclusionary rule to be applied; instead, the Court suggested
that civil law suits and other local checks on police would suffice. 72 This conclusion was hotly disputed by Justice Murphy
in his dissenting opinion.73
This ideological battle over the proper remedy for police
violation of the Fourth Amendment has had an enormous impact on the development of principles related to standing. 74
HARV. L. REV. 1304 (1951) .
•• [d.
.. [d.
.. Almost two decades after the exclusionary rule had been adopted in Mapp,
President Ronald Reagan established a commission which recommended it be
abolished. In its report, the task force explained:

Legislation should be proposed and enacted to abolish the exclusionary
rule as it is applied to Fourth Amendment issues.
. . . Anyone evaluating the exclusionary rule must constantly keep this
basic premise in mind. The Framers of the Constitution did not create
the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment. They
could have done so. . . . The exclusionary rule is instead a judicially
created rule of procedure that fails to serve the goals it seeks, and fails
at a tremendous cost.
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 24-25 (1982).
•• 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
71 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31 .
• 2 [d .
• 3 [d. at 42 (Murphy, J., dissenting) .
•• [d.
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That is because if reluctance to impose the severe sanction of
exclusion is present in a court's analysis of Fourth Amendment
claims, then it might be tempted to seek limitations on standing to avoid rendering favorable relief to a criminal defendant. 75 When there was no exclusionary rule, there was little
need to erect complicated standing principles because there
was no fear that evidence would be excluded from consideration. 76 The absence of standing cases in the Fourth Amendment arena prior to Mapp v.Ohio 77 may well be explained by
the absence of the exclusionary sanction in state courts.
Prior to Mapp, the Supreme Court had little trouble concluding that the government could not use illegal practices
against an individual with no standing in order to obtain evidence against another defendant. 78 In McDonald v. United
States,79 the Court held that a co-defendant had the right to

76

AB one scholar has observed:

The rules or "legal technicalities," as they are sometimes called by persons disgusted with a particular outcome, are not devised solely with an
eye to ascertaining guilt or punishing the guilty; that could be expeditiously with the thumbscrew and very efficiently and inexpensively in
our pharmacological age with one sort of drug or another . . . . The reason for this is not hard to fmd. The forms of due process may protect
the criminal, but, more importantly, they also protect the innocent.
WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 185 (1987).
76 It was not until Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), that the Supreme Court recognized the exclusionary rule in federal trials barring the use of
illegally seized evidence. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
n 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
78

It has long been the case, however, that nearly all claims to enforce
constitutional rights may be raised only by those who have "standing" to
assert them. The Fourth Amendment is no exception to this principle.
That is, a person who makes a motion to suppress evidence that the
government intends to use against him at trial must show that he was
"a victim of search or seizure . . . directed at someone else."
In short, Fourth Amendment rights are personal. They may not
vicariously be asserted.
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 355 (3d ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960), overruled
on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980».
79 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
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complain about searches of his alleged accomplices. so The Supreme Court, however, backed away from McDonald's defendant-friendly principle in Wong Sun v. United States 81 and ALderman v. United States. 82
Clearly, a plausible explanation for the erosion of the socalled derivative standing rule 83 is the Court's application of
the exclusionary principle adopted in Mapp. The controversy
that generated from the Court's incorporation of the
exclusionary rule led to an inflammatory national debate about
the Warren Court's criminal justice jurisprudence.84
Limitations on standing merely served to ease the blow of
the Mapp decision which was seen as another liberal opinion of
a defendant-friendly Supreme COurt. 85 Indeed, the criticism of
the Warren Court became quite severe by legal scholars. 86

McDonald, 335 U.S. at 456.
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
82 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
83 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (overruling sub silentio the notion of derivative standing).
84 As early as the 1950's, Chief Justice Earl Warren was criticized for being
soft on crime by other members of his profession. "The Conference of State Chief
Justices in 1958 went so far as to pass a resolution condemning the Warren
Court for its erosion of federalism and its tendency 'to adopt the role of
policymaker without proper judicial restraint.'" DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER:
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 306-07 (1986).
85 One commentator poses the question about the effectiveness of the Warren
Court in this way:
80

81

Did the Warren courtrs] criminal justice decisions have any real
effect on the behavior of police? Some have suggested that the criminal
justice decisions were a failure. It has been argued that while some Supreme Court decisions have resulted in allowing concededly guilty defendants to go free, there has been no demonstrable beneficial change in
police practices.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURsUIT OF JUSTICE 96 (1998).
88

Eminent scholars from many fields have commented upon the [Warren
Court's] tendency towards over-generalization, the disrespect for precedent, even those of recent vintage, the needless obscurity of opinions, the
discouraging lack of candor, the disdain for the fact finding of the lower
courts, the tortured reading of statutes, and the seeming absence of
neutrality and objectivity.
Milton Handler, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws: A Critic's View Point,
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After Mapp, the Gideon V, Wainwright 87 decision was yet
to come, imposing the cost of court appointed counsel on the
State to enforce these newly recognized constitutional rights. 88
Later in the decade, the Court would again borrow from wellestablished federal investigative practice and require state
police to give warning to criminal suspects in the historic decision of Miranda v. Arizona. 89 Miranda again spurred the national debate about the Warren Court's criminal justice policies. 90
Three years later, the Supreme Court dealt the first of
several sever blows to the Fourth Amendment in Alderman v.
State 91when it held that granting standing to Alderman
would "encroach[] upon the public interest in prosecuting those
accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.,,92 As one
insightful commentator has noted, "[e]ssentially, the standing
requirement is the Supreme Court's declaration that the cost of
the exclusionary rule can become too great to bear.,,93
Rather than a mere procedural requirement, Alderman
triggered an era where standing became a substantive limitation on the right to assert a violation of personal privacy.94 At
a time when the Court was recognizing new zones of privacy
like in Roe v. Wade 95 and Griswold v. Connecticut,96 the
Court was expressing its preference for privacy in broad contexts. 97

1 GA. L. REV. 339, 350 (1967).
87 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
88 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-44.
89 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90 The Miranda opinion was greatly criticized by some legal scholars. See, e.g.,
Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph
Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM.CRIM. L. REv. 243 (1987).
91 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
92 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 175.
93 DRESSLER, supra note 78, at 359.
94 [d. at 301-302.
95 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
96 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97 See, e.g., id.; Thornburgh v. Am. CoIl. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986) ("Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution em-
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KATZ, SMITH AND 'RAKAs: RECONCILING STANDING AND
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY

Perhaps the most familiar phrase in all Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is the "reasonable expectation of privacy.'19S Unfortunately, it explains little, leaves many questions
unanswered and presents one of the greatest constitutional
moving targets of all time. 99 This is particularly true in our
high technology age. loo This is an amazing legacy of a word
that has been in the constitutional lexicon for less than four decades. IOI
It may be that "reasonable expectation of privacy" is an
utterly undeterminable phrase since it requires any interpreter
of its provisions to first define the audience to which its words
apply.l02 In the midst of this confusion, both the rules of privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment and the doctrine
of standing have become hopelessly tangled together. 103
Ironically, it was a case that favored the defendant which
began the faulty framework for the standing problem that
plagues the current Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Katz v.
United States,I°4 the Court held that the government illegally

bodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept
largely beyond the reach of government. ").
98 A reasonable expectation of privacy is the legal determination of the substantive Fourth Amendment right to privacy. It has the practical effect of establishing when the right may be asserted. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526
(1984) (holding that prisoners have no legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of their jail cells).
99 When one speaks of vague concepts like "reasonable" and "expectation,"
interpretation is necessarily broad since these ideas are subjective even when an
attempt at reaching group consensus is attempted. [d. at 525.
100 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
102 "In Orwell's society, there was no right of privacy or expectation of privacy.
In our society, privacy is highly valued and some legal rights of privacy do exist.
Yet privacy, in the sense of being able to control information about oneself, is
also an eroding condition." M. ETHAN KATSH, LAw IN A DIGITAL WORLD 227-28
(1995) (footnote omitted).
103 See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (standing and search
and seizure are concepts that are difficult to separate).
104 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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intruded on a telephone conversation by attaching an electronic
listening and recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth. 105
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on several circumstances that would be difficult to duplicate today.106 The
Court reasoned that the intrusion on the incriminating telephone call was improper because once Katz placed the fee in
the phone and closed the door he created a setting where he
did not expect to be overheard. 107
The majority's opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart
rested on the curious and unnecessarily restrictive statement
that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.,,10B
106 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466
(1928), the Supreme Court approved wiretapping, concluding that it did not
amount to a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In one of the
most famous dissenting opinions in American history, Justice Louis Brandeis
prophesied:

The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
106 When you consider how technology makes issues obsolete, Katz itself provides an ironic example. At the time of the decision, telephone booths were com·
mono Currently, few people make calls from an enclosed telephone booth.
107 An important aspect of electronic searches is their potential scope. They are
not merely limited to information or historical facts, but permit access to discovering future events. As one commentator explained:
The conventional search is limited to a designated thing in being--()ne of a finite number of things to be found in the place where the
search is to be conducted, and ordinarily discoverable in a single brief
visit. On the other hand, electronic surveillance is a quest for something
which may happen in the future. Its effectiveness normally depends upon
a protracted period of lying-in-wait. For however long that may be, the
lives and thoughts of many people-not merely the immediate target but
all who chance to wander into the web--are exposed to an unknown and
undiscriminating intruder. Such a search has no channel and is certain
to be far more pervasive and intrusive than a properly conducted search
for a specific, tangible object at a deimed location.
Ralph S. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in
Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 189 (1969).
108 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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He also stated that the Fourth Amendment could not be translated into a general constitutional right to privacy.I09 Stewart,
however, ultimately rested his decision on the proposition that
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."llo
However, it was in John Marshall Harlan's concurring
opinion that it was first articulated that a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in certain activities. 111 He described what he believed were the two components necessary to
establish such a privacy right. First, the person must have
exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy. 112 Second, the individual must establish that it was an expectation
"society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'1l3

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citation omitted).
111 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
112 [d. What we feel is private from others is based not only on our perception
of whether we are in a secure setting, but how interested we believe others may
be in what we are doing.
113 [d. One Fourth Amendment historian has explained that the:
109

110

Amendment provides that if there be a search and seizure it must be a
reasonable one. The only absolute standard that is set is as to the essentials of the warrant when such is necessary, as it is in most cases.
The purpose of the latter part of the Amendment of course is to safeguard against the general warrant and it does this in two ways: fll'st, by
prescribing the requirement of probable cause, necessarily peculiar to uh
case; and second by making requisite the description of the particular
place to be searched, the person apprehended, and the objects to be
seized.These requirements limit the scope of each warrant; they take the
decision as to what may not be done out of the hands of the officer who
is to execute the warrant, and place it with the more trustworthy and
sober judgment of a judicial officer. It is for the latter to pass upon the
merits of the allegations and, on the basis of evidence having behind it
the responsibility of an oath, to decide whether there is reasonable justification for this exceptional proceeding in invasion of the individual's
privacy, and thus to determine what particular actions are justified on
the basis of this showing. There is no temptation for the ministerial
officer to exceed the authority which the magistrate decides to give him,
for he not only thereby subjects himself to civil and criminal liability but
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It is difficult to establish Harlan's motivation for crafting
such an ambitious and comprehensive search and seizure test.
He afforded little justification for his new analysis and did not
discuss some basic issues, like the potential impact of future
technology on the reasonable expectations of persons seeking to
keep a wide range of activities private. 1l4 Indeed, Harlan's
heavy reliance on expectations may have begun the process of
lowering the mark of Fourth Amendment protection from a
somewhat fixed, stable set of privacy expectations based on
property rights into a prohibition against government intrusion
that shifts as governments' ability to intrude becomes improved
by technology. 115
gains no advantage over the accused and merely wastes his efforts.
NELSON B. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 120 (1937).
114 One scholar has noted that the historical analysis of the Fourth Amendment has been somewhat unpredictable.
[T]he Court has at times employed a non-historical analysis to interpret
the commands of the Fourth Amendment. It has asserted that law enforcement practices are not "frozen" by those in place at the time the
Fourth Amendment was adopted. Hence, interpretation of the Amendment permits modern developments: "Crime has changed, as have the
means of law enforcement, and it would therefore be naive to assume
that those actions a constable could take in an English or Americar.
village three centuries ago should necessarily govern what we, as a society, now regard as proper." Thus, the court has sometimes asserted
that the Amecdment's "prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and conditions.m
Thomas K Clancy, What Constitutes an "Arrest" Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, 48 VILL. L. REv. 129, 184 (2003) (quoting Steagald v. United States,
451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981» (footnotes omitted).
"6 The ability of government to intrude electronically increases each day as
technology advances. With statutory controls it is likely that fewer areas of our
lives can be kept private. One insightful commentator has explained that:
"(E]lectronic surveillance is almost inherently indiscriminate." Interception
of a telephone line provides to law enforcement all of the target's comI:.unications, whether they are relevant to the investigation or not, raising concerns about compliance with the particularity requirements in the
Fourth Amendment and posing the risk of general searches. In addition,
electronic surveillance involves an on-going intrusion in a protected
sphere, unlike the traditional search warrant, which authorizes only one
intrusion, not a series of searches or a continuous surveillance. Officers
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The test articulated by Harlan in Katz was embraced by
the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland 116 where the Court
distinguished the privacy expectation it had protected in the
Katz telephone booth from that of a telephone company's "pen
register."ll7 The pen register is the telephone company's device, housed at its facility, which records the dialed telephone
numbers of a given telephone. 118 At the behest of the government, the dialed numbers from Smith's telephone were recorded and turned over to the government. 119
The Court noted that the pen register had a much more
limited capacity than the listening device used in Katz.120 The
court explained "[a]lthough most people may be oblivious to a
pen register's esoteric functions, they presumably have some
awareness [from notices in phone books] of one common use: to
aid in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene
calls. "121 The Court reached the conclusion on little more than
loose conjecture that Smith probably did not believe the numbers he dialed were private. 122
The Court further dispatched the defendant's constitutional

must execute a traditional search warrant with dispatch, not over a
prolonged period of time. If they do not fmd what they are looking for
in a home or office, they must leave promptly and obtain a separate
order if they wish to return to search again. Electronic surveillance, in
contrast, continues around-the-clock. for days or months. Finally, the usefulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the suspect.
James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB.L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 70 (1997)
(quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting»
(footnotes omitted).
118 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
117 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-45; see United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249
(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that information obtained from pen register placed on
telephone line is admissible even if order authorizing it did not comply with statutory requirements).
118 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
119 Id. at 742.
120 [d. at 741.
121 [d. at 742.
122 [d. The notion that at the time Smith was decided a telephone caller would
believe that their dialed number was generally available would be inaccurate.
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claim by concluding that the telephone company was a third
party to whom the defendant voluntarily exposed the dialed
number. 123 Thus, the Court reasoned, the defendant's expectation of privacy was not reasonable. l24 This logic, though easy
to explain on its face, has many intellectual flaws.
First, it defies logic to suggest that anyone person would
publish to the public all the calls he made during the course of
his day.125 The telephone company at that time was a monopoly for which no reasonable communication options existed. To
equate the entity of the telephone company with a careless
sharing of information with a friend you should not have trusted is not a fair assessment of anyone's reasonable understanding of privacy.126
As the dissenters appropriately noted, the "prospect of
unregulated governmental monitoring. . . [is] disturbing even
to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individuals, including members of unpopular political organizations or journalists
with confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disc1o-

Id. at 743-44.
at 744.
126 If there is any doubt that the government continues to construe Smith with
any less than the broadest possible scope, the testimony of Deputy Associate
Attorney General Kevin DiGregory during a congressional hearing on government
surveillance issues is instructive. DiGregory said:
123
124

[d.

[T)he Supreme Court held in Maryland v. Smith [sicl, I believe in 1979,
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers dialed
by a telephone because essentially, when someone turns over information
to a third party like the telephone company, they should not have either
a subjective or an objective reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information.
See Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Program: Hearing
Before H. Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Congo
78 (2000) (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assoc. Att'y Gen.).
126 In United States V. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966), the Supreme Court
held that the use of a government informant who turned out to be a false friend
was not a violation of Hoffa's constitutional rights. The expectation that we must
live our life constantly on guard for who we may trust is an unsettling idea that
the law should be concerned if our society truly values personal privacy. "The
concept of intrusion holds that a protected zone of privacy exists into which governments and others cannot ordinarily and freely intrude for purposes of obtaining information." NIMMER supra note 18, at 16-8.
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sure of their personal contacts."127
It is difficult to measure the harm. to Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence done by the unartful opinion in Smith. By using
the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine as the cornerstone of its analysis, it improperly applied both the spirit and
the letter of the test as it reached its decision. 12s
The very nature of the telephone company's pen register
technology, as a monopolistic database available to the government without warrant requirement protection for citizens,
lowered the analytical fence for a whole generation of new
technologies not even dreamed possible by the Supreme Court
at the time of the Smith decision. 129 Today, the pen register
has come home in the form of caller ID technology which we
now take for granted. lao But how many of us would like anySmith, 442 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"The analogy in personal information focuses more on the value of nondisclosure. Privacy rights apply to information not widely and generally known . . .
for which disclosure might cause loss in terms of harassment, embarrassment, or
similarly adverse consequences because of the sensitivity of the information to the
individual." See NIMMER, supra note 18, at 16-6.
129 See EMORD, supra note 22.
130 Extending the logic of Smith v. Maryland, courts have held that caller
identification systems that trap and preserve numbers present no constitutional
problem because there is no protected privacy interest in the information. For
example, in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775,
779-80 (S.C. 1991), the court explained:
12'1

128

The United States Supreme Court has previously held that callers do
not have an expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. . . . In
light of [this) holding . . . that the telephone number of the equipment
from which a call has been placed is entitled to more privacy than the
telephone numbers called by someone. The telephone number from which
a call which is placed . . . is numerical information passed through the
telephone network, voluntarily transmitted as a result of call placement.
Caller ID service simply does not violate any right that rises to the level
of constitutional protection. No fundamental interest is involved in the
anonymity of a telephone number.
One court however, has held that under its state wiretapping law, caller ID
without a blocking mechanism violated privacy rights. Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 576 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). That court reasoned, "telephone
service [customers) should not suffer an invasion, erosion or deprivation of their
privacy rights to protect the unascertainable number of individuals or groups who
receive nuisance, obscene or annoying telephone calls which can already be traced
or otherwise dealt with." [d.
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one, particularly government officials, to have any-time access
to our caller ID box or our cellular telephone bill complete with
telephone numbers called and received and our geographical
location, and time of both received those who we contacted and
those who tried to contact US. 131 Because of the Smith decision, any information kept in any communication company
database would not be private simply because the third-party
vendor collected it on an electronic database. 132
The troubling consequence of the Smith opinion is that all
feelings that an individual possesses about privacy are subordinated to the fact of the locations where the private information
is stored. 133 Critical to the existence of any constitutional
right under the Smith analysis is the question of "where the
information lives?".134 Is it in a network system, a home comSee United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992).
The broadest implication of Smith would suggest that "[e]fforts to apply
general restrictions on government data collection under concepts of constitutional
information privacy [will] generally fail." See NIMMER, supra note 18, at 16-24.
133 Electronic communication from the privacy of one's home has clearly been
diminished by the Smith approach. As one scholar has explained, traditionally,
the home enjoyed the greatest degree of constitutional protection:
131
132

Indeed, one could say that the Framers were particularly sensitive about
safeguarding private homes from governmental intrusion, as the constitutional privilege against unreasonable search and seizure "arose from the
harsh experience of householders having their doors hammered open by
magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the crown. . . . "
There is no doubt that the Framer's envisioned the home as deserving
special protection from governmental intrusion. The common law developed strict rules regarding when an officer could forcibly enter a person's
home to effectuate an arrest or conduct a search. Arrest warrants were
generally required to enter a home to make an arrest, and warrants
were obligatory if government officers wanted to enter a home to conduct
a search. In other words, a warrantless search of a home was out-of
bounds, so to speak.
Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REv. 895, 933-34 (2002).
134 One scholar has suggested that the proper question for purposes of determining whether there has been a constitutional violation of one's privacy interest
is "whether the papers or personal property [is] mine, whether the house is mine,
whether the body is mine? If the answer is yes, then one has the right to exclude the government from searching or seizing." Thomas K. Clancy, Coping with
Technological Change: Kyllo and the Proper Analytical Structure to Measure the
Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 72 MISS. L.J. 525, 564 (2002) (suggesting
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puter hard drive or a distant internet connected database?
Under Smith, it may not matter because all are accessible to a
third party-the custodian of the database. 135
In the electronic storage world brought about by the
growth of personal computing, network systems and the
internet over the past decade,136 the ramifications of Smith
suggest a world where the responsibility to prove a constitutional right rests with the person who seeks privacy but cannot
totally guarantee that all he seeks to keep private is absolutely
secure. It would be troubling to believe the Founding Father's
would have found such a narrow view of the Fourth Amendment acceptable. 137
It is equally troubling to believe that expectations of privacy are dictated solely by the government's ability to intrude
with improved technology rather than one's legitimate desire to
keep information private. 13B Such formulations would leave

that although government has the right to reasonable intrusion on privacy, "the
burden is [always] on the government to justify its actions").
135 The Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a New York central computer
databank containing the names and addresses of all persons obtaining drugs by
prescription. The Court concluded:
We are not aware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation
of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or
other massive government files . . . . The right to collect and use such
data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
136 Courts have ruled that e-mail and subscriber information is not entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection because individuals have no legitimate privacy
interest. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).
137 One Supreme Court Justice has said:
[TJhe concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth
Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly allow an all-powerful
government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and other benign
purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield
them from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them
health and strength to carry on.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136 A grave concern is that one's expectations are dictated by the government's
ability to intrude.
The emphasis on subjective expectations poses a further serious threat to
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only the traditional contents of a private home protected.
Automobiles have lost almost all privacy.139 They can be
stopped for even the most trivial of reasons and searched very
easily after they are stopped. 140 Drug detection dogs can be
brought to the scene of the stops,141 and guests in the vehicle
have little right to object to any intrusion of their movement
once the vehicle is pulled over. 142
IMPRACTICAL STANDING: AVOIDING WASTED TIME AND
OPPORTUNITY

One of the problems confronted by courts is the temptation
to avoid resolving constitutional issues on the basis of the
standing doctrine when a good deal of effort has been done to
craft the substantive Fourth Amendment issues. l43 Many
courts have demonstrated a willingness to avoid reaching the
merits of a Fourth Amendment issue even when the answer
fills obvious gaps in a dispute in a case involving multiple codefendants l44 are police search procedures that are likely to

the vitality of the lFlourth [A)mendment. Repeated invasions by credit
bureaus, employers, and the like can lead persons to discount most expectations as unreasonable; individual fears of a loss of privacy then
become self-fulfilling prophecies. In particular, the government can
through its actions redefme popular expectations so as to undermine constitutional rights.
Comment, Legitimate Expectations of PrilJacy Against Unreasonable Searches and
the "Automatic Standing Rule," 94 HARv. L. REV. 196, 203 (1980) [hereinafter Legitimate Expectations) .
• 39 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814-815 (1996) (unanimously
ruling that the police officer's subjective intent is irrelevant to the constitutional
validity of a traffic stop).
• 40 See Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS
RACE & L. REv. 117 (2001) (detailing the broad powers of police making vehicle
stops).
14' See, e.g., United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir. 1993)
(dog sniff not a search because individual did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in contraband stored in his warehouse) .
• 42 See Maclin, supra note 140, at 142-43 .
• 43 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) ("The
Standing requirement derives from the constitutional and prudential limits to the
powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary.").

...
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recur over and over again.
No case illustrates the temptation to avoid ruling on the
constitutional merits more than Ricks v. State. l45 In Ricks,
the Baltimore City Police Department pursued a Baltimore
drug investigation which ultimately resulted in the prosecution
of three co-defendants. 146 "James A. Ricks, Kevin R.
DeShields and Van Allen Lewis 0 were identified as part of the
narcotics distribution organization. ,,147 During the course of
the investigation the police used "pen registers, physical surveillance, and 'wiretap' orders" to gain information about the
suspected drug organization. 148
On June 8, 1984, Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Milton B. Allen issued an order authorizing the use of an electronic listening and recording devices at 2500 Edgecomb Circle
North Apartment 1. 149 Prior to becoming a judge, Milton Allen

In a 22-page order, Judge Allen concluded that there was probable cause
to believe that the controlled dangerous substances laws were being
violated by individuals using the subject apartment; that the use of the
audio and video devices was necessary and essential to gain evidence
leading to the solution of these crimes and the prosecution of all individuals therewith connected. The order specified that evidence could not be
otherwise obtained since alternate investigative methods had been tried
and failed and will not succeed in the future, or were too dangerous to
undertake.
Ricks v. State, 537 A2d 612, 615 (Md. 1988).
145 Ricks v. State, 520 A2d 1136 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), affd 537 A2d 612
(Md. 1988).
148 [d. at 1138.
147 Id.
148 [d.
140 [d.

Pursuant to Judge Allen's order, officers entered the air ducts of the
apartment through the roof, shaved away part of the dry wall and implanted a miniature camera, focused on the dining room of the apartment. After several weeks of observation and twenty-five hours of recorded video tape, a search warrant was issued to search the apartment on
August 7, 1984. Both heroin and cocaine were seized. The appellants
Ricks and DeShields were arrested within the apartment. Appellant Van
Allen Lewis was also present in the apartment during the raid; he fled
and was captured shortly thereafter.
Ricks, 537 A2d at 615.
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was the first African-American State's Attorney in Baltimore
City when elected in 1971. Before that time he had spent a
long, noteworthy career as a criminal defense attorney. ISO
According to investigation records, the apartment was
suspected of being a "processing house" or "cut house" for diluting and packaging drugs for street sale.l5l The men were
charged with and convicted of possession with the intent to
manufacture or distribute heroine and cocaine. 152 An appeal
was taken to the State's intermediate appellate court, the
Court of Special Appeals. That court refused to reach the merits of appellant's Fourth Amendment search and seizure
claim. 153
The court appeared to treat the case as one of first impression in the nation where police obtained a warrant for video
surveillance in a private residence prior to using wiretaps or
listening devices being used prior to secret video recording. 154
Although the court noted that other issues in the case were
"eclipsed by the magnitude of the video surveillance question,"155 it quickly rejected the defendants' claims. The court
held that the defendants did not demonstrate "a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the searched premises and none of
their Fourth Amendment rights were violated. ,,156
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rakas v. Illi-

1110 See Gn.BERT WARE, FROM THE BLACK BAR: VOICES FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 110130 (1976).
151 Ricks, 520 A.2d at 1138.
162 ld.
1153 In their appeal, the appellants argued that the "warrant purporting to
authorize the surreptitious video surveillance in a private place was invalid under
Maryland law since the general assembly clearly intended to place controls on all
manner of secret, electronically aided surveillance by law enforcement in areas
not in plain view." Id. (court omitted citation).
164 See id. On earlier occasions in its history, the Supreme Court has upheld
other intrusive surveillance technologies. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129, 135 (1942) (using detectaphone, which captures sound waves placed against
the wall of an office was not an unconstitutional intrusion because there was no
trespass).
1&8 Ricks, 520 A2d at 1138.
166 Id. at 1140.
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nois,I57 the court reasoned in its decision that the defendants
"admitted that they had no proprietary interest"I58 in the
apartment, but claimed only to be "invited" there. I59 The court
concluded that merely being invited into a residence was not
enough to challenge the observation and taping of their images
inside. ISO
The defendants appealed that decision to the state's highest court, the Maryland Court of Appeals. I61 The court acknowledged that the threshold issue was standing. 162 The
court, however, examined the facts in greater detail than did
the court of special appeals. The opinion of Chief Judge Murphy pointed out that at least one of the co-defendants, Ricks,
had a key to the apartment. I63
Rather than making a definitive ruling that any of the
defendants had standing, the court merely "assume[d], without
deciding, that the appellants had Fourth Amendment standing
to challenge the search and seizure in this case."I64
The court, however, rejected the defendants Fourth
Amendment claims, holding that the State did not need to use
a less intrusive means of investigation prior to using the highly
intrusive video recording cameras. 165 Although the Fourth

439 U.S. 128 (1978).
Ricks, 520 A2d at 1140.
158 [d.
160 [d. The storing of visual images, in general, raises many concerns in society. "Video Surveillance cameras quietly scan many workplaces. Neighborhood
retailers now stock hardware that used to be the stuff of spy novels." Richard
Lacayo, Nowhere to Hide, TIME, Nov. 11, 1991, at 34.
161 Ricks, 537 A.2d 612.
162 [d. at 612.
163 [d. at 619.
1114 [d. at 620.
165 [d. at 621-22. In examjnjng the appellants' Fourth Amendment claim, the
court of appeals took more care than the intermediate appellate court in detailing
the nature of the drug investigation and the techniques used prior to seeking the
video camera. It explained that:
157
158

Pen registers were utilized; long-distance telephone tolls and criminal history records were monitored; various forms of mobile and fIXed
surveillance were undertaken, as was use of contact and bumper beepers,
attempts to obtain codefendant cooperation, to infiltrate the organization,
to conduct a grand jury investigation, to the issuance of search warrants,
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Amendment claims offered by the defendants did not prevail,
that decision was not the most troubling part of this case. 166
Even though state and federal officials were willing to treat the
defendants as having a right to challenge the searches of the
apartment, the tentative nature of their approach left open a
disturbing possibility.
Should the courts of law be permitted to avoid examining
the propriety of new technology after long investigations merely
by relying on the technical objection of standing?167 It appears

and other investigative methods.
ld. at 614, n.4.
The Court further related the alleged justifications for the more intrusive
video surveillance technique:
Notwithstanding the extensive and lengthy investigation . . . which utilized or considered utilizing all manner and means of conventional and
innovative techniques, the application recited that the police were unable
to determine the organization's method of interstate supply and the
location of other places where the illegal drugs were stored before distribution. The application explained that the organization's members were
so disciplined in their speech as possibly to result in failure of interception of oral communications by audio devices; and that authority was
therefore necessary to install a video tape camera within the apartment
to observe the various aspects of the illegal enterprise. The application
recited that a single surreptitious entry to install both electronic devices
was essential to avoid detection and to minimize the danger to those
authorized to enter the apartment to install the video camera and bugging device.
According to the affiants, additional evidence was needed to demonstrate sufficient probable cause to arrest the high echelon members of
the organization, who were the primary targets of their surveillance . . . . [Tlhe affiants related that an authorized search of the apartment would not reveal the source or method of the organization's drugs
and distribution, nor would it reveal sufficient information to destroy the
organization; moreover, an authorized search of the subject apartment at
that time would make it impossible to locate other of the organization's
stash houses.
ld. at 614-15 (footnote omitted).
166 See Thomas M. Messana, Note, Ricks v. State: Big Brother has Arrived in
Maryland, 48 MD. L. REv. 435 (1989) (discussing concerns about the Ricks opinions).
167 In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 676 (1973), an environmental
group sued to keep railroad freight charges low which it believed would reduce
the amount of litter in national parks because train traffic promoted more recycling. It claimed that its group members "breathe[dl the air" and "used" the
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that even the two state court opinions, acknowledging the important constitutional questions raised, did not deter a halfhearted approach to deciding the question. The courts should
have fully embraced their responsibility to get the question
answered so that other relevant privacy stakeholders could
respond to the outcome. 16S
In cases where new technology is confronted in the courts,
the substantive issues need to be immediately addressed so
that the court process can be completed and the legislature can
respond if it chooses. Failure of the courts to make clear that
they will reach the merits of cases involving new technology
leaves the legal path to address privacy issues exceedingly
unclear. 169
Such uncertainty creates an atmosphere where more intrusive technology can be developed without adequate privacy
safeguards. Ricks presents a constitutional close call. Although
the court of appeals reached the privacy claim, its hesitation
could be interpreted as a signal by other courts that avoiding

parks. Id. at 678, 682. The Court concluded this group did have standing because
it would mean that some "widespread government actions would be questioned by
nobody." Id. at 688.
168 As technology increases the ease of intrusion, courts should be more willing
rather than less willing to reach the merits of search and seizure questions not
only in our homes but everywhere. "As society has evolved and our li~es have
become more mobile, as we spend more and more of our waking hours away from
home, there may be even more reason to prize our right to preserve secrecy outside dwellings and to be concerned with novel perils generated by scientific and
technological progress." See James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of
the Fourth Ameruiment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MIsS. L.J. 317, 425 n.386
(2002).
169

An unresolved issue in the evolution of privacy law is when government
data systems should be protected as a private recourse and when they
should be treated as a public location in respect to individual privacy
interests.
Against what interest does the property right fail? . . . Thus, for
example, in applying for services, credit, or government benefits, privacy
interests typically do not permit the individual to elect not to disclose
information pertinent to the person making the decision about eligibility
for such items.
NIMMER, supra note 18, at 16-7.
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the privacy merits by relying on standing is an acceptable alternative. 170 The procedural tool of standing cannot be used to
avoid the court's role as a first responder in the constitutional
structure to protect us from new, intrusive and sometimes
secret search and seizure technology.l7l
STANDING ON LoGICAL SOLUSIONS

Many critics of the Warren court and its liberal Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence have also embraced the adoption of
stringent standing rules. 172 The all or nothing exclusionary
rule sanction has encouraged courts to use any device to avoid
imposing its strict requirements. 173 Concern about national
security and awareness of increasing terrorist activity in the
United States will likely make police investigative conduct seen
as more reasonable. 174 The catastrophe of September 11, 2001
has made our nation painfully aware of the risks inherent in
free society. 175
The benefit of a free society demands careful attention to
the rule of law. Furthermore, if we are to continue to have an
exclusionary rule, consistency and clarity in its application are
absolutely critical in our high technology world. 176 The
jurisprudence reasonable expectation of privacy as it has currently been formulated by the Supreme Court is inadequate to
address the current search and seizure landscape. 177
110 For example, the Supreme Court has held that a court is required to inquire whether the police action was in fact a seizure before determining whether
there was a Fourth Amendment violation. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295 (1999).
171 The Supreme Court has already demonstrated a willingness to allow technology such as tracking devices to evade constitutional scrutiny. See United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that placing a beeper type location
device without a warrant in a barrel of contraband is not a search under the
Fourth Amendment).
112 See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 84, at 164-69 (discussing the Warren Court's
standing requirements).
173 See BORK, supra note 12, at 104.
17. See Gibeaut, supra note 33, at 35.
175 1d. at 32.
176 See Dempsey, supra note 115, at 88-89.
m One critic of broad government surveillance asserts that:
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A change in substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine is not
the so much the issue as is the question of how will emerging
new surveillance technology be evaluated as reasonable or
unreasonable under traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine. 178
Fortunately, a few adjustments to the current approach to
standing will provide an opportunity for clear judicial guidance
by removing barriers to ruling on the Fourth Amendment merits in selected cases in certain high technology areas. 179

The history of intelligence in this country is dominated by a systematic invention, usurpation, and abuse of the power to engage in it. In
American public life we almost invariably reduce power conflicts to issues of due process, of individual rights; the one is typically abstract,
and the other more accessible because it is specific and "human." . . .
But one can hardly sweep under the rug the wealth of evidence
that intelligence in this country has emerged and spread into a formidable instrument of control simply as the result of a series of power grabs.
For more than three decades J. Edgar Hoover claimed that the FBI had
been entrusted by a presidential directive of September 1939 with an
open-ended intelligence mission unrelated to law enforcement.
FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 7 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1980).
178 "The Fourth Amendment's touchstone is reasonableness, and a search's
reasonableness is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." United States
v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 113 (2001) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
300 (1999».
179 Professor Arthur Miller, in a prophetic statement about a quarter of a
century ago, framed the challenge of the courts' role in privacy protection and the
challenges that courts and society would face as we anticipated the promise of
the high technology age. He wrote:
The notion that the courts will recognize a general principle requiring
data handlers to treat personal information as confidential or will declare that file keepers owe a fiduciary duty to file subjects seems to be
wishful thinking. Nor is it realistic to think that a pledge of confidentiality can be secured on a contractual basis. In most situations involving
data extraction, the individual is in no position to demand a promise to
this effect. Of course, the courts may change their attitude when the
potentialities of the computer become apparent. But to wait for the
courts to create common-law obligations and impose them on information
extractors, processors, transmitters, and users for the benefit of data
subjects will require the patience of Job and may prove to be no more
fruitful than agitating for the expansion of the common-law privacy action. Time is a luxury personal privacy cannot afford and the glacial
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First, the concept of automatic standing,180 once abandoned needs to be revisited for searches involving the capture
of a person's image by any means-electronic, photographic or
digital. 181 It should not matter how the image was obtained,
because it would defy logic to suggest a person does not have
an interest in the interception, recording, or storing of their
image by a government entity .182 Such interest in recorded
image has long been taken for granted in tort law. 183 Actions
for invasion of privacy and actions for commercial use of one's
private image have been recognized even prior to the age of
high technology surveillance.
The concept of reasonable expectation of privacy will still
by applied by considering the degree to which a person has
knowingly exposed themselves to the public. l84 The objective
test that has traditionally been applied to such government
searches need not be abandoned. For example, most public
travel in open spaces easily would be constitutionally permitted
because of courts' traditional "open fields" analysis. 185
movement of legal doctrine is inappropriate for the problem at hand.
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AsSAULT ON PRIvACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 220 (1971).
180 Some states have adopted automatic standing rules in order to make challenging searches and seizures less burdensome. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 440 A.2d
1311, 1320 (N.J. 1981).
I.' New forms of surveillance technology that actually record facial images and
compare features to other persons located in computer databases have been increasingly used by law enforcement. See Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial
Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL.INTERDISC. L.J.
295, 303-08 (1999) (describing digital and biometrics technology).
'82 Public use of intrusive video technology is growing. See M.J. Zuckerman,
Chances Are, Somebody's Watching You, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2000, at 01.A (describing a forty million dollar surveillance center using 110 remote control cameras in the suburbs of Washington).
183 However, when one goes out in public the interest in that privacy is also
diminished in tort claims. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383,
391-92 (1960) (stating that the tort of invasion of privacy is not implicated when
a photograph of a person is taken in public "since this amounts to nothing more
than making a record, not differing essentially from a full description, of a public
sight which anyone present would be free to see").
'84 See Legitimate Expectations, supra note 138, at 203.
186 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (holding unanimously that
revenue agents who observed illegal liquor trafficking from an open field violated
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It is my view, however, that the discussion of standing that
sometimes arises from search and seizure matters involving
recording a person's image may obscure or eliminate court's
analysis of the reasonableness of the government's surveillance
technique that led to one's recorded image. Such an adjustment
would not unduly hamper the efforts of law enforcement to
"ferret out crime"l86 with improved surveillance technology. It
would, however, require accountability when new technology is
used, because courts would be encouraged by the automatic
standing rule to reach the merits in these alleged intrusion
cases. 187
It is obvious that technology will always be created far
faster than society's ability to evaluate or regulate it with legislation or by court rule. This being the case, it is desirable that
courts should confront the new enforcement tool on a case-bycase basis and are in a peculiarly good position to be gatekeepers of the reasonableness of these technologies.
If courts are encouraged to rule on each and every matter
by applying an automatic standing approach, government law
enforcement agencies will be required to describe the use of
new, more invasive technology if they intend to introduce its
fruit as evidence. 188 The legislature may respond with appropriate legislation after it is made aware by court proceedings
that new technology has been utilized. If the legislature does
not respond, courts will continue to formulate policy as to reasonableness and use traditional application of precedent and
no constitutionally protected interest).
186 illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
181 See generally Jose Felipe Anderson, Accountability Solutions in the Consent
Search and Seizure Wasteland, 79 NEB. L. REV. 711 (2000) (arguing for more
police accountability in searching and seeking confessions).
186 One scholar has gone so far as to suggest that, "[iJn this area of rapid
technological change, the freedom to be unnoticed in public, and its associated
benefits, will disappear unless a right to public anonymity is recognized and enforced." Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MIss. L.J. n4, 217, 314-15 (2002) (arguing that
the Fourth Amendment should be construed to recognize a right to public anonymity as a part of privacy expectations because "government surveillance of our
innocent public activities that are not meant for public consumption is neither expected nor to be condoned").
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stare decisis as courts examine the propriety of government
intrusion. 189
A practice that encourages, rather than discourage, these
emerging technologies to be submitted to judicial evaluation
better serves the orderly development of the law. Applying an
automatic standing rule regarding such searches is both logical
and practical. Some states have already imposed automatic
standing rules through the legislative process. 190 It may be
that even due process would require that standing be granted
to support meaningful review of the means by which the government obtained a person's image. To do otherwise might
allow privacy rights to be violated by supporting the rights
without meaningful remedies.
SMITH V. MARYLAND: OUTDATED BEFORE ITS TIME

The application of Smith v. Maryland 191 to modern technology needs to be carefully reexamined. It was a flawed decision from the day it was announced, but as time and technology have advanced, it has become abundantly clear that the Supreme Court's heavy reliance on third party access to databases
as undermining the expectation of privacy has created a major
gap in privacy protection. 192 At a minimum, automatic stand-

189 Someone must be the monitor of fIrst instance as new, more intrusive,
technology is used by law enforcement; but do courts have any real impact on
how government agents intrude? "Some suggest that the police will always fmd
their own ways to evade constitutional rules; others maintain that even in the
best of circumstances the Supreme Court is just too distant from the day- to-day
decisions of the policeman ... to have any systematic effect on police behavior."
See HORWITZ, supra note 85, at 96.
190 See, e.g., State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977 (La. 1976) ("Any person adversely
affected by a search or seizure . . . shall have standing to raise its legality in the
appropriate court." (quoting LA. CONST. art. I, § 5».
191 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
192 "Although the conflicting interests involved are compelling, the paramount
function of national security is to vigilantly protect the ideals embodied by the
very same Amendment that the standard violates. Those ideals cannot be whittled
away in today's desire to defend the very same values that provide for our security." David Hardin, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of
the USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 291, 345 (2003).
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ing to challenge evidence collected by the government in remote
information databases needs to be recognized.
The modern era of easy information storage and retrieval
has created a privacy crisis in which it is impossible to know
who has the power to transmit or store information that a
person might seek to keep private. 193 The government has a
responsibility to investigate crime and protect citizens. Obviously, the government·must legitimately invade private matters and collect that information from diverse sources,194 but
increased capability to intrude requires increased accountability. If the facts support their investigative needs, they should
not fear an impartial magistrate's review. 195
Emergency situations involving terrorism, hostages, or
circumstances of imminent danger would obviously create a
need to intrude on a wide range of records,196 but there is no
need to prevent those whose records have been obtained from
electronic storage from litigating the government's justification
and process for obtaining the data.
I do not suggest that improving investigative capability is

193 It has been argued that a "good society must have its hiding places-its
protected crannies for the soul. Under the pitiless eye of safety the soul will
wither." Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE
L.J. 1161, 1172 (1966).
190 Law enforcement obviously needs data in order to investigate and prosecute
crime. High technology has proven particularly useful in the prosecution of offenders engaged in child pornography. See Jason Krause, Can Anyone Stop Internet
Porn?: Courts Have Shot Down Laws Protecting Kids from Obscenity Online. Is
Cyberspace Suited for a Virtual Privacy Wrapper?, 88 A.B.A. J. 56 (2002).
19. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967), the Supreme
Court said:

The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a
grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses
to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
The key is to insert a disinterested magistrate between the government official and the citizen to give the right against unreasonable
search and seizure meaning.
[d. at 532-33.
198 See Milligan, supra note 181, at 297.
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a constitutional evil. I do not wish to be misunderstood to desire fashioning rules that benefit defendants simply because of
the conservative leanings of the Rehnquist COurt197 or to recapture the nostalgia of the often defense-friendly Warren
COurt. 198 Law enforcement should be permitted to do its job
based on articulable facts and reasonable need. Emerging technology requires that government be prepared to articulate their
need to intrude as their ability to intrude increases. 199
Privacy issues, particularly as they relate to stored electronic data bases, need to be examined by legislatures for adequate controls. 20o In the meantime, the Supreme Court should
place responsibility for advances in more intrusive technology
on the government that seeks to use it. The court should not
apply the reasonable expectation of privacy approach to electronic databases in the same manner as it is applied to the
protection of abandoned trash.201 Medical,202 genetic,203
and financial data204 should be afforded greater care from

19'/ See generally Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist Court:
Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273 (1987) (discussing Justice
Rehnquist's views and the effect he will have on the Court).
198 See generally Fred Gilbert Bennett, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review:
An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 UCLA L. REV.
1129 (1973) (discussing the Warren Court's exclusionary rule and arguing for its
expansion).
199 One insightful commentator has noted that "technological advances pose the
challenges that always beset the constitutional enterprise-those involved with
trying to create flxed rules, or at least a workable rule of law, for a changing
world.~ Susan Bandes, Power, Privacy, and Thermal Imaging, 86 MINN. L. REv.
1379, 1383 (2002).
200 See DOHERTY, supra note 29, at 51-52.
201 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39-40 (holding that one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacY in abandoned trash placed at the curb).
202 Se!! Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privaey, 80 CORNELL L.REV.
451 (1995) (discussing generally the confldentiality of health records).
203 See Richard C. Turkington, Medical Record Confidentiality Law, Scientific
Research and Data Collection in the Information Age, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 113
(1997).
2.. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (fmding no reasonable
expectation of privacY in fmancial information contained at the defendant's bank
because a "depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the
information will be conveyed by that person to the [glovernment.~ (citing United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971))).
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government scrutiny and the presumptions for warrants to
access information should be respected.
The everyday use of cellular telephone communication205 ,
e-mail and other information sharing and communication technology in an increasingly paperless world requires that we
constantly monitor new forms of intrusion. 206 The recent use
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Carnivore program for
reading e-mail is an interesting example. 207 The technology
for reading e-mail is actually physically attached to the information service provider's equipment. 208 This technology was
not even on the congressional radar screen until after it had
long been in investigative use. 209 Automatic standing rules
would have engaged court review of the technology as soon as
the government would have attempted to use the evidence
obtained against anyone in any court.210 Assuring more
prompt litigation of the reasonableness of the use of such technology will promote public confidence that law enforcement will

205 Cellular telephones have less constitutional protection than a standard telephone that was contemplated in Katz. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d
171 (5th Cir. 1992).
206

The explosion of data collection on individual, he said gloomily, has
reached the point where it is very difficult for us even to begin to establish any kind of control over our privacy. . . . The hazard is multiplied
when information on individuals that is collected for one purpose turns
up being used for some other purpose. This inevitably happens when you
get a pooling of data from agencies, with multi-access terminals.
VANCE PACKARD, THE PEoPLE SHAPERS 151-52 (1977).
2m "Carnivore is '[e)ssentially a personal computer stuffed with specialized
software, [which) represents a new twist in the federal government's fight to
sustain its snooping powers in the Internet age.' The Wall Street Journal also
reported that Carnivore 'can scan millions of e-mails a second. . . . '" Trenton C.
Haas, Carnivore and the Fourth Amendment, 34 CONN. L. REv. 261 (2001) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's
Wiretaps to Scan E-mail Spark Concern, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3).
208 "The Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . asserts that Carnivore represents
the FBrs latest effort to keep abreast of the rapidly changing demands of law enforcement. . . . It stresses that Carnivore does not collect all of the data traveling
over a network." Id. at 262 (footnote omitted).
209 See supra note 128, at 31.
210 See, e.g., Culotta, 343 So. 2d at 981-82.
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abide by its dual responsibility to investigate crime and respect
constitutional rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 211 The
spirit of the Founding Fathers requires no less. 212
CONCLUSION

Concerns over national security as we enter the new century have caused us to reconsider our crime fighting techniques.
The rapid increase of technology has created uncertainty about
what constitutional protection citizens really possess.213 Innovative use of automatic standing rules will help unclutter the
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It will also help ease the
confusion created by the Supreme Court's short-sighted precedent in Smith v. Maryland. The rapid growth of technology at a
pace that state and federal legislatures could not hope to ever

211 "The preservation of freedom requires a positive and continuing commitment." ARTHuR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF
FREEDOM 189 (1949).
21. Professor Lawrence Tribe reminds us:

As Sophocles said, nobody has a more sacred obligation to obey the
law than those who make and enforce it.

[T)hose who wrote the Constitution's limitations on how suspects
may be pursued obviously knew that taking those limits seriously-that
is, obeying them rather than flouting them-would necessarily prevent
some guilty people from being apprehended and convicted.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GoD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 8 (1985).
213 On commentator has explained that:
For a number of reasons, discernment of the relationship between
technology and the threshold of the Fourth Amendment is an exceedingly
difficult undertaking. The novel, sometimes ingenious, devices that give
rise to constitutional questions that were unknown to and unanticipated
by those who drafted the Constitution. The conduct these mechanisms
make possible often bears little or no ostensible resemblance to the physical intrusions that troubled our ancestors. Nonetheless, the dramatic
increases in human capacities they afford can threaten the very same
privacy interests that are violated by physical intrusions. Moreover, technological tools sometimes pose novel threats to privacy by enabling officials to gain access to potentially confidential information that was wholly unreachable in an earlier age.
James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A
Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 445 (2002).
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keep pace with is a problem that becomes a greater concern
with each passing day.214 A reasonable balance should be
struck between law enforcement's effective use of new technology to investigate crime and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Of course, law enforcement should have
available the best tools of technology to stop crime. 215
Accountability, however, for the use of those tools needs to
be maintained. 216 Safety and security are a greater concern
than ever before. We should always be mindful of the need to
be secure from both terrorism and more traditional types of
criminal behavior.
Law enforcement needs the best tools to investigate
crime.217 Their power, however, is not unlimited, nor should it

214 See Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security
with Privacy Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 80 DENY. U. L. REV. 375 (2002).
21. The use of drug testing technology, for example, has reached into the
nation's high schools. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995)
(validating drug testing in high schools even without suspicion).
216 The serious consequences of error in a world dominated by high technology
law enforcement cannot be overstated. In the very common example of police
record checks during vehicle stops, the person stopped has no choice but to rely
on the accuracy of the information contained in the police database. One court
considered the importance of deterring even innocent neglect of inaccurate information that leads to arrests. People v. Joseph, 470 N.E.2d 1303, 1305-06 (ill.
App. Ct. 1984). In refusing to extend a good faith exception to faulty information
in a computer search relied on by police, the Illinois Supreme Court explained:

The situation in the instant case reflects a matter within the responsibility and control of police authorities who failed to update their
records to accurately reflect defendant's current status. In this age of
computerization, we do not believe it would be appropriate to sanction
the arrest here, thereby allowing law enforcement authorities to rely on
an error of their own making. Moreover, it is our opinion that the goodfaith reliance of the arresting officer in acting upon information provided
to him through police channels, cannot overcome the intrusion made
upon defendant's lFlourth [Almendment rights.
Id. at 1306 (citation omitted); see also Ott v. State, 600 A.2d Ill, 118-19 (1992)
(rmding that the State failed to establish that a delay of seven days over a weekend and holiday in removing outstanding arrest warrant from police computer
records was reasonable).
217 The Supreme Court has, in some circumstances, approved certain law enforcement techniques involving technological advances to aid police in crime control. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (approving high-tech
police observation of a residence from an airplane under the plain view doctrine).
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be unchecked. 218 The courts have a responsibility to understand its role as the first stop on the road to clarification of the
law which guards our privacy and our precious way of life.
Clarification of our approach to standing is one of the important ways we can maintain a proper security and privacy balance in a high technology age.

U8

Professor Yale Kamisar correctly observes:

[Tlhe Fourth Amendment may plausibly be viewed as the centerpiece of a free, democratic society. All other freedoms presuppose that
lawless police action have been restrained. What good is freedom of
speech or freedom of religion or any other freedom if law enforcement
officers have unfettered power to violate a person's privacY and liberty
when he sits in his home or drives his car or walks the streets?
Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment and Its Exclusionary Rule, THE CHAMPION,
Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 20-21.

